I think it is clear that Russia felt threatened by NATO expansion since the 1990s and this played a role in the decision to invade Ukraine. This does not excuse their actions, but perhaps if different decisions had been made in the 1990s and 2000s we would not be here. Given that we are here, the question is how much to support Ukraine and oppose Russia militarily. Some are suggesting that pumping in as many deadly weapons as possible will shorten the war and ultimately reduce civilian suffering. Some scholars, for example the ones quoted in this Atlantic article, are citing evidence for the opposite. My hunch has always been that there may be a rational case for war to achieve geopolitical objectives at times, but I doubt that it ever reduces civilian suffering.

Alex Downes has conducted methodologically rigorous research on the causes of civilian victimization, a wartime strategy that targets and kills noncombatants. To this end, he compiled a data set of every country in the world that participated in “interstate wars between 1816 and 2003, which produced a list of 100 wars, 323 belligerent countries, and 52 cases of civilian victimization.” He found that states are significantly more likely to escalate against the population as they become more desperate from higher battlefield fatalities, longer war duration, or the transition of the conflict to a war of attrition.

Whether civilian victimization pays remains contested, but the strategic logic is not—to sap the morale of an adversary’s population or undermine the enemy’s ability to resist. Empirical research by other scholars with different samples likewise finds that “as a conflict actor weakens relative to its adversary, it employs increasingly violent tactics toward the civilian population as a means of reshaping the strategic landscape to its benefit.” Contrary to the conventional wisdom, scholarship suggests that Ukrainian citizens may paradoxically benefit from us supporting them less.

Atlantic