I am concerned that nuclear war is becoming more scary and thinkable all the time, and politicians are focused elsewhere. One thing the U.S. can do is just be less scary. We need to put ourselves in others’ shoes and realize that they find us threatening, don’t fully trust us, and feel they have to be prepared to defend themselves against us. Being less threatening does not have to make us appear weak – we can let people know we are strong and ready to defend ourselves and our allies if attacked, while reassuring others that they are in no danger if they don’t threaten us. This seems like a basic playground philosophy, but I don’t see our warmongering politicians talking this way.

War on the Rocks has a wonky article on what a modern arms control framework could look like. Let’s pull back a little bit and work on peace and risk reduction.

In my book, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control, I propose that we embrace an ambitious goal of extending the three norms of no use, no testing, and no new proliferation to the 100th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Imagine, if you can, a world in which nuclear weapons have not been used on battlefields for 100 years, and a world in which nuclear weapons have not been tested by major and regional powers for almost five decades. Imagine, too, that North Korea remains the last nuclear-armed state. Now imagine the perceived utility of nuclear weapons in 2045. How many potential mushroom clouds would be required for deterrence? How high would the barriers be against use and testing? …

A seven-nation forum consisting of the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France would be hard to steer, but the nuclear dangers we now face are interconnected and unwieldy. When the nature of a problem seems intractably complex, the wisest course might just be to expand the scope of the problem. Even as the four pairs compete, they have the most to lose if key norms are broken and the most to gain if they are extended. Existing bilateral conversations on nuclear risk reduction would, of course, continue, but there are no effective channels of communication and substantive exchanges between India and China and between India and Pakistan, where border clashes are becoming more intense. A non-hierarchical, seven-nation approach to norm building might just succeed. All seven have significant concerns about the intentions and capabilities of states with the most dynamic nuclear modernization programs. Each state has its own reasons to engage, as well as to be wary. If other states are willing to sit at the table, it becomes harder for anyone to hold out.

War on the Rocks

The article gets much more specific from there, and is worth a read. Joe Biden should read it. If his major legislative accomplishments are likely to be behind him by the end of 2022 as we expect, he could try to leave the world a legacy on nuclear arms control, climate change, pandemic preparedness and biological weapons control in his remaining 2-6 years in office. He wouldn’t need direct support from the U.S. Congress, although we have learned that without the executive and legislative branches moving in lockstep, international agreements are not always durable and other countries will conclude they can’t rely on us. Still, any forward progress on any of these issues would be a significant contribution to the future of our nation and our global civilization.