Tag Archives: climate change

new political push for carbon tax in the U.S.

There is a new emerging push for carbon taxes in the U.S., led by Republicans and using pro-business language. According to Bloomberg:

The campaign, dubbed Americans for Carbon Dividends, aims to bolster a carbon tax-and-dividend plan advanced by prominent Republicans a year ago, using more aggressive lobbying and advertising to line up support with hopes of winning congressional passage after the 2020 elections.

Under the Climate Leadership Council’s blueprint, every ton of carbon dioxide would be hit with a $40 tax, with the price rising over time and revenue redistributed to households in the form of quarterly dividend checks. In exchange, regulations aimed at cutting carbon dioxide emissions — and much of the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to regulate them — would be eliminated.

Companies that emit greenhouse gas emissions also could win liability protection insulating them from litigation over the costs of climate change — a potentially enticing sweetener as lawsuits mount

So, nominally anti-tax, anti-deficit politicians would get a revenue neutral program, anti-regulation politicians would get to trade away regulations in favor of taxes, and even the fossil fuel industry would get some liability protection. The other implication here seems to be that at least some Republicans in Congress are starting to think about a post-Trump world after 2020, and/or are willing to look for issues where a veto-proof super-majority could be possible.

Antarctic ice sheet melt accelerating

The rate of melting in Antarctica is accelerating, according to a new study in Nature.

…it lost 2,720 ± 1,390 billion tonnes of ice between 1992 and 2017, which corresponds to an increase in mean sea level of 7.6 ± 3.9 millimetres (errors are one standard deviation). Over this period, ocean-driven melting has caused rates of ice loss from West Antarctica to increase from 53 ± 29 billion to 159 ± 26 billion tonnes per year; ice-shelf collapse has increased the rate of ice loss from the Antarctic Peninsula from 7 ± 13 billion to 33 ± 16 billion tonnes per year.

hurricanes slowing down

Hurricanes appear to be slowing down. This might sound like a good thing, but no it means they could be dropping more rain in any one place, like Harvey did on Houston. In Nature:

 As the Earth’s atmosphere warms, the atmospheric circulation changes. These changes vary by region and time of year, but there is evidence that anthropogenic warming causes a general weakening of summertime tropical circulation1–8. Because tropical cyclones are carried along within their ambient environmental wind, there is a plausible a priori expectation that the translation speed of tropical cyclones has slowed with warming. In addition to circulation changes, anthropogenic warming causes increases in atmospheric water-vapour capacity, which are generally expected to increase precipitation rates9. Rain rates near the centres of tropical cyclones are also expected to increase with increasing global temperatures10–12. The amount of tropical-cyclone-related rainfall that any given local area will experience is proportional to the rain rates and inversely proportional to the translation speeds of tropical cyclones. Here I show that tropical-cyclone translation speed has decreased globally by 10 per cent over the period 1949–2016, which is very likely to have compounded, and possibly dominated, any increases in local rainfall totals that may have occurred as a result of increased tropical-cyclone rain rates. The magnitude of the slowdown varies substantially by region and by latitude, but is generally consistent with expected changes in atmospheric circulation forced by anthropogenic emissions. Of particular importance is the slowdown of 30 per cent and 20 per cent over land areas affected by western North Pacific and North Atlantic tropical cyclones, respectively, and the slowdown of 19 per cent over land areas in the Australian region. The unprecedented rainfall totals associated with the ‘stall’ of Hurricane Harvey13–15 over Texas in 2017 provide a notable example of the relationship between regional rainfall amounts and tropical-cyclone translation speed. Any systematic past or future change in the translation speed of tropical cyclones, particularly over land, is therefore highly relevant when considering potential changes in local rainfall totals.

hottest May recorded in U.S. was during the Dust Bowl, until last month

May 2018 broke a heat record last set during the 1930s Dust Bowl. I’m trying to think of some clever Grapes of Wrath reference to illustrate how clever and well-read I am. Nothing is coming. Well, let’s just point out that last time it was this hot, a segment of the U.S. population was living in poverty as a result.

climate change is going to cause some economic damage

A letter in Nature says climate change is going to cause economic damage, and meeting the UN’s emissions targets would reduce that damage. Here’s the abstract, and the article itself is open access.

 International climate change agreements typically specify global warming thresholds as policy targets1, but the relative economic benefits of achieving these temperature targets remain poorly understood2,3. Uncertainties include the spatial pattern of temperature change, how global and regional economic output will respond to these changes in temperature, and the willingness of societies to trade present for future consumption. Here we combine historical evidence4 with national-level climate5 and socioeconomic6 projections to quantify the economic damages associated with the United Nations (UN) targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C global warming, and those associated with current UN national-level mitigation commitments (which together approach 3 °C warming7). We find that by the end of this century, there is a more than 75% chance that limiting warming to 1.5 °C would reduce economic damages relative to 2 °C, and a more than 60% chance that the accumulated global benefits will exceed US$20 trillion under a 3% discount rate (2010 US dollars). We also estimate that 71% of countries—representing 90% of the global population—have a more than 75% chance of experiencing reduced economic damages at 1.5 °C, with poorer countries benefiting most. Our results could understate the benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 °C if unprecedented extreme outcomes, such as large-scale sea level rise8, occur for warming of 2 °C but not for warming of 1.5 °C. Inclusion of other unquantified sources of uncertainty, such as uncertainty in secular growth rates beyond that contained in existing socioeconomic scenarios, could also result in less precise impact estimates. We find considerably greater reductions in global economic output beyond 2 °C. Relative to a world that did not warm beyond 2000–2010 levels, we project 15%–25% reductions in per capita output by 2100 for the 2.5–3 °C of global warming implied by current national commitments7, and reductions of more than 30% for 4 °C warming. Our results therefore suggest that achieving the 1.5 °C target is likely to reduce aggregate damages and lessen global inequality, and that failing to meet the 2 °C target is likely to increase economic damages substantially.

My head gets just a little twisted around thinking of reduced damages. This means the economy, and presumably our grandchildren’s quality of life, will be worse than it could have been if we started making an effort and investment now. But this doesn’t tell us if they will be absolutely better or worse off in a “future baseline” scenario compared to now, just that they will be worse off relative to that future baseline if we don’t take action than if we do. I think the various (very eye catching) graphs in this paper probably contain the answers to these questions, but I didn’t get it after an admittedly short few minutes staring at them, and I admit I didn’t read every word in the paper.

The other thing here is that we are taking a given climate scenario (1.5 or 3 degrees C warming for example), and talking about the benefits of those two future scenarios against each other. What I don’t see is the cost to the current generation if we choose to make this sacrifice, or even if it is a sacrifice at all. What investment would we have to make to achieve 1.5 vs. 3 degrees, and are there alternative investments we could make that could have a bigger payoff. I am not arguing against climate action, I am just questioning how this paper is communicating about costs and benefits in the present and in the future.

May 2018 in Review

Most frightening stories:

Most hopeful stories:

  • There are some new ideas for detecting the potential for rapid ecological change or collapse of ecosystems.
  • Psychedelics might produce similar benefits to meditation.
  • Microgrids, renewables combined with the latest generation of batteries, are being tested in Puerto Rico.

Most interesting stories, that were not particularly frightening or hopeful, or perhaps were a mixture of both:

dystopian Schumpeter meets Keynes

This article is about a serious attempt to consider climate change in a traditional economic model. Where does the dystopian part come in? Well, it sounds like the model suggests we are not going to innovate our way out of the consequences of climate change.

For these reasons, we develop the Dystopian Schumpeter meeting Keynes (DSK) model, which is the first attempt to provide a fully-fledged agent-based integrated assessment framework. It builds on Dosi et al. (2010, 2013, 2016) and extends the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) family of models, which account for endogenous growth, business cycles and crises. The model is composed by heterogeneous firms belonging to a capital-good industry and to a consumption-good sector. Firms are fed by an energy sector, which employ dirty or green power plants. The production activities of energy and manufacturing firms lead to CO2 emissions, which increase the Earth surface temperature in a non-linear way as in Sterman et al. (2013). Increasing temperatures trigger micro stochastic climate damages impacting in a heterogeneous way on workers’ labour productivity, and on the energy efficiency, capital stock and inventories of firms.

The DSK model accounts both for frequent and mild climate shocks and low-probability but extreme climate events. Technical change occurs both in the manufacturing and energy sectors. Innovation determines the cost of energy produced by dirty and green technologies, which, in turn, affect the energy-technology production mix and the total amount of CO2 emissions. In that, structural change of the economy is intimately linked to the climate dynamics. At the same time, climate shocks affect economic growth, business cycles, technical-change trajectories, green-house gas emissions, and global temperatures…

Simulation results show that the DSK model is able to replicate a wide array of micro and macro-economic stylized facts and climate-related statistical regularities. Moreover, the exploration of different climate shock scenarios reveals that the impact of climate change on economic performances is substantial, but highly heterogeneous, depending on the type of climate damages. More specifcally, climate shocks to labour productivity and capital stocks lead to the largest output losses and the highest economic instability, respectively. We also
find that the ultimate macroeconomic damages emerging from the aggregation of agent-level shocks are more severe than those obtained by standard IAMs, with the emergence of tipping-points and irreversible catastrophic events.

how fish will move under climate change

It seems to me that fish might be able to adapt to climate change a little easier than other species, because they can just swim to a new part of the ocean that is now like what their old part of the ocean used to be like.

Projecting shifts in thermal habitat for 686 species on the North American continental shelf

Recent shifts in the geographic distribution of marine species have been linked to shifts in preferred thermal habitats. These shifts in distribution have already posed challenges for living marine resource management, and there is a strong need for projections of how species might be impacted by future changes in ocean temperatures during the 21st century. We modeled thermal habitat for 686 marine species in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans using long-term ecological survey data from the North American continental shelves. These habitat models were coupled to output from sixteen general circulation models that were run under high (RCP 8.5) and low (RCP 2.6) future greenhouse gas emission scenarios over the 21st century to produce 32 possible future outcomes for each species. The models generally agreed on the magnitude and direction of future shifts for some species (448 or 429 under RCP 8.5 and RCP 2.6, respectively), but strongly disagreed for other species (116 or 120 respectively). This allowed us to identify species with more or less robust predictions. Future shifts in species distributions were generally poleward and followed the coastline, but also varied among regions and species. Species from the U.S. and Canadian west coast including the Gulf of Alaska had the highest projected magnitude shifts in distribution, and many species shifted more than 1000 km under the high greenhouse gas emissions scenario. Following a strong mitigation scenario consistent with the Paris Agreement would likely produce substantially smaller shifts and less disruption to marine management efforts. Our projections offer an important tool for identifying species, fisheries, and management efforts that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts.

April 2018 in Review

Most frightening stories:

Most hopeful stories:

Most interesting stories, that were not particularly frightening or hopeful, or perhaps were a mixture of both: